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Glossary
ASV – automated speaker verification
FAR – false acceptance rate
FRR – false rejection rate
EER – equal error rate
IVR – interactive voice response
PAD – playback attack detector
PIN – personal identification number
RA – replay attack
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Introduction
In last  10 years1 a great deal of interest has grown around using biometric solutions for 
identification and authentication. The usability of biometric solutions is on the rise with the ever-
growing adoption of smart phones and cloud technologies which enable cost-effective solutions 
for example in the cases of face and speech recognition. 
Biometry is a field that deals with identifying people based on their biological characteristics. 
These characteristics might include the person's voice, face, fingerprints, palm veins, but also 
the person's  gait or writing style. Biometric authentication ascertains the  person's identity by 
“who the person is”, as opposed to knowledge-based authentication  which deals with identifying 
the person by “what the person has or knows”. 
This thesis is written with the intent of being used in a proof of concept open source multi-
modal biometric project for the Tartu University Biometry Group. The aim of the project is to 
create a biometric system that only relies on open source tools, but includes face recognition, 
speaker and voice recognition.
Ones of the motivations for using biometric authentication is that a correctly realized 
biometric solution might provide a more user-friendly and secure alternatives to knowledge-
based solutions. 
The main security problem for biometry are replay attacks –  a class of attacks where the 
authentication process or authentication signal is replayed, thereby gaining access to the secured 
resource. The prevention of replay attacks is critical for assuring security for any biometric 
system. 
This thesis focuses on a very specific way to protect a biometric system from replay attacks. 
A closer look will be taken at speaker-authentication systems where the user is authenticated 
based on the user's unique voice pattern. Naïve implementations of such a system would be 
vulnerable to replay attacks due to fact the user's speech could be easily recorded and replayed to 
1 For the latest developments in the field of biometric authentication see “Recent Applications in Biometrics” 
(2011) by Jucheng Yang and Norman Poh 
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the system thereby allowing access to unauthorized people, trivially breaking any sort of security 
that it would otherwise provide.
These aforementioned problems could be remedied by employing vocal random challenges. 
The idea behind vocal random challenges is that on every authentication attempt the user is 
prompted with a random challenge (or word or a sequence of words) that the user must then utter 
in order to gain access. Thusly the simpler forms of replay attacks can be prevented because the 
challenge will be unique for every authentication attempt and mere replays will not grant there 
attacker access. 
One of the motivations for this thesis is that there has not been much academic publications 
about the implementation and security of  vocal random challenges. In addition to this,  there are 
many proprietary closed source applications, but no free open source ones available. Thus the 
goal was to a great a piece of software that could copy the functionality of that commercial 
products provide.
For the recognition of vocal random challenges, an open source PocksetSphinx[1][2]  toolkit 
which was developed by Carnegie Mellon University is  used. This piece of software will be 
compared to other free open source speech recognition solutions available. A brief overview of 
the available commercial closed source applications for speech recognition will also be given.
While biometric authentication in general can be applied to the same areas as knowledge-
based authentication, we shall only consider the areas of interest where voice-based 
authentication is applicable due to cost-effectiveness and the nature of the business processes. 
Let us consider some of the areas where voice-based biometric authentication could be applied to 
see the motivations for employing voice-based biometric authentication. Voice Biometrics 
Group lists the following practical uses for voice-based authentication [3]: 
 IVR2s and call centers –  inbound calls could be handled and authenticated through the 
use of  automated systems. These systems authenticate the user using either static text 
password or numeric pass phrases or free speech. For example, Kivox 4.0 by Agnitio 
provides this feature[4].
 Distance and online learning  –  educational institutions can verify unobtrusively that 
students that take courses and exams remotely, are who they claim to be.
2 See the glossary for this and forthcoming abbreviations 
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 Password reset systems  –  banks, telecoms  and other institutions can use automated 
systems that authenticate the users based on their voice in conjunction with a password 
phrase
 Multi-Factor web security – existing web-based solutions can supplement their  existing 
knowledge-based solutions with voice-based biometric solutions.
 Parolee and offender monitoring  – parolees and sex offenders can be monitored at their 
homes by  random calls requiring them  to  utter  a  random  word. A  product  called 
Shadowtrack provides this opportunity, for example. [5]
 Remote time and attendance  –  companies can use it to check in on their employees, so 
that they can see if they are working as required.
 Clinical trials and research  – researchers in the fields of pharmacy and medicine are 
looking into implementing voice verification and identification systems to deter 
fraudulent report of results. 
 Enterprise remote access  –  large corporations need to enable access for remote 
employees to the corporate the IT infrastructure. 
 Forensic identification  – forensic systems aim to identify who the speaker is, typically on 
a limited amount of sample data. This is particularly useful for military and intelligence 
communities, federal state and local governments. For example, S.P.I.D [6], software 
developed by Nuance provides this feature
 Smartphone security  – smartphones can be used to make online payments or carry out 
other online transactions. VoicePay, a company based in Germany uses voice verification 
technologies by VoiceTrust [7] 
To further exemplify the viability of voice-based biometric authentic, consider the following 
example where the cost-effectiveness of telephone-based password resets has been surveyed. The 
Gartner groups' research concluded that 80-90% of help-desk cost is composed of password 
resets for the users. A single call costs a company that uses help desk workers an estimated $30-
$31. It should be fairly obvious that this enormous cost for the company could be greatly reduced 
by employing voice-based automated password resets instead to have them handled by human 
staff. The aforementioned Gartner survey claimed that a company that switched to the automated 
system using biometric authentication saved up to $600, 000 per annum [8]. This would mean 
that improving the cost-effectiveness through the use of voice-based authentication is definitely 
feasible and worth looking into.
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In the first chapter of this thesis will give an overview of the current state of biometric 
authentication technology, and briefly summarize what the motivations, advantages and 
disadvantages of using biometric technology are.
The second chapter employs the concepts introduced in the first  chapter for the voice-based 
biometric authentication. A demonstration of the main threat to voice-based biometric systems – 
replay attacks - is provided. The chapter concludes by weighing several options for dealing with 
this problem, and finally  provides a solution that employs vocal random challenges.
Finally, in the third chapter, an overview of the greater  biometric  system  in  which  the 
practical  output  of  this  thesis  will  be  implemented  will  be  given.  For  clarification  a  brief 
overview about  how speech recognition  works,  is  also  given.  This  chapter  also  includes  an 
assessment  of  the  currently  available  open  source  speech  recognition  frameworks,  and  the 
rationale behind choosing Pocket Sphinx as the framework for the practical solution. 
As a result of the thesis a working piece of software in the Python programming language will 
be produced using the aforementioned PocketSphinx voice recognition toolkit. More specifically 
two versions of the software will be produced:
1. A demonstration application with graphical user interface to demonstrate the possibilities 
of the authentication for hypothetical applications.
2. A command line utility that could be integrated into or invoked from any program to add 
speech recognition capabilities to it. 
8
State of the Art
Publications
The existing literature on replay attacks on voice-based systems is quite sparse. Replay 
attacks are discussed in the literature, but most of them rely on building mathematical models for 
detecting impostures rather than employing random challenges. Despite this, it is useful to list 
these static pass phrase approaches discussed in the academia, because they might explain the 
rationale behind preferring them over random challenge-based methods.
Malik (2011) claims that while there has been a lot of research into countering attacks against 
synthesized voice, not a lot of research has been conducted on replay attacks. In the same paper 
Malik proposes a mathematical approach for modeling replay attacks. Malik claims that 
employing higher-order spectral analysis can be used to capture traces of nonlinearities in the 
cloned or replayed speech of the targeted speaker. Malik proposes a scale invariant moments 
based detection framework to detect cloned audio recording using replay attacks.[9] 
Shang (2008) proposes a playback attack detector (PAD) for voice-based authentication 
systems to counter replay attacks.  While this thesis concerns itself with non-static random 
passwords and pass phrases, then Shang discusses using predetermined, fixed passwords. Shang 
rationalizes this choice by referring to several weaknesses in the non-static random challenge 
scenarios. Shang's PAD approach  relies on the random nature of human speech: if any two 
utterances of the pass phrase are deemed to be too similar to each other by the PAD system, the 
access to the system will not be granted.[10]
Genoud and Chollet (1999) demonstrate how an automatic speaker verification (ASV) system 
can be vulnerable to speech concatenation attacks.  In a concatenation attack it is assumed that 
the attacker has managed to get a hold of the uttered pass phrase and some other sentences 
uttered by the person. After this, the attacker proceeds by splitting the recorded message into 
words  that  can   then  be  concatenated  to  form  any  combination  of  the  required  random 
challenges. [11]
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Other researchers have abandoned the idea of solely relying on voice or any single biometric 
characteristic altogether. Rather, they rely on the fusion of multiple biometric characteristics. 
Several researchers have approached the problem of biometric authentication with  the novel 
approach of using face recognition in conjunction with voice recognition. They have employed 
the concept of liveness. The user is asked to blink or smile to prove in real-time that the 
authenticator is real alive person, instead of a prerecorded video presented by an impostor. [12]
Commercial solutions
Although there is not too much academic literature written on employing random pass phrases 
to secure voice-based biometrics as described in previous section, they are already being used by 
many of the commercial solutions.  Some commercial solutions will be listed here, but this 
listing should by no means be considered conclusive. 
RVA-Authenticate
This is a product by the Canadian company Perceive Solutions. It claims to authenticate the 
user based on whether the correct phrase was utter, and whether the phrase was uttered by the 
authorized person says. [13]
PERCEIVE claims that its software can be integrated into:
 IVR systems to provide automated and secure authentication using randomly 
generated pass phrases that meet the customer’s specifications 
 internet websites 
 custom applications
ComBiom
ComBiom is product by a Swiss company Biometry AG. Their product uses a combination of 
face, lip movement, voice recognition,  and also employs vocal  random challenges. During 
enrollment the user is prompted to utter  the digits  from 0 to 9 [14]. ComBiom as a product is 
especially  important  for  this  thesis,  because  creating  an  application  with  the  capabilities 
comparable to that of ComBiom was the main objective of the biometry project briefly discussed 
in the introduction of this thesis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to biometric authentication 
1.1 The Concept of Biometric Authentication 
1.1.1 Knowledge-based Authentication
Let us start by clarifying what exactly biometric authentication methods are. Currently most 
of the systems in practice employ authentication techniques that do not use biometric challenges, 
but are  knowledge-based.  Knowledge-based authentication  refers to methods that require the 
person to prove to the system that they are who they present themselves as by using pre-shared 
information. This might appear in the form of a password, a PIN code, a secret question or the 
like.[15]
1.1.2 Biometric Characteristics
Biometric authentication methods conversely,  rely on biological measurements for 
authentication. The user is authenticated not by “what the person has”, but rather “who he is”. 
[15]
It  should  be  noted  that  not all biological measurements are suitable for authentication, 
however. In their article  Jain et al (2004) point out four criteria for biometric characteristics. 
Any human physiological and/or behavioral characteristic can be used as biometric characteristic 
as long as it satisfies the following criteria[16]:
1. universality - each person should have the characteristic
2. distinctiveness - any two person should persons  should be sufficiently different in terms 
of the characteristic
3. permanence - the characteristic should be sufficiently invariant 
4. collectibility - the characteristic can be measured quantitatively
In addition an additional non-functional criterion is mentioned:
      5. user-friendliness or non-obtrusiveness - the characteristic can be measured in a manner 
that is acceptable by the user. To further elaborate this criterion we can compare two modes of 
proposed  biometric  authentication:  fingerprint  scanning  and  DNA-collection.  It  is  clear  that 
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using a fingerprint scanner is far less obtrusive and faster than DNA-collection. DNA-collection 
is  not  cost-effective,  cannot  be  easily  automated,  and  furthermore,  obtrusive  modes  of  the 
collection  of biological  material  in  a  very explicit  manner  can harm the public  reception  of 
biometric technology, as people become concerned for their privacy. [16]
1.2 How Biometric Authentication Works
Let's start out with defining the basic components and procedures of a biometric system. From 
these basic building blocks systems of any level of complexity can be created.
1.2.1 Components
1. Sample - A biometric measure presented by the user and captured by  the data collection 
subsystem as an image or signal. [17]
2. Feature - A mathematical representation of the information extracted from the presented 
sample by feature extraction / selection. [17]
3. Template -  A  user’s  stored  reference  measure  based  on  features  extracted  from 
enrollment samples. [17]
1.2.2 Enrollment and Recognition
A biometric system has of two main procedures - enrollment - the initial act in which an agent 
presents her biometric data to the system and enables access to a certain resource via this form of 
authentication,  and identification (recognition) - the act in which an agent presents her biometric 
data to system to be checked an existing template to gain access to the aforementioned resource. 
Figure  1  depicts  the  general  the  process  of  enrollment  and  recognition  for   biometric 
authentication systems respectively. [16]
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We can think of enrollment and identification as high level concepts that are presented to the 
end-user. This, however, says little about the inner workings of a biometric system. These 
processes will be now be further elaborated in the next section.
1.2.3 The Steps of Enrollment and Identification
 
Acquisition is the process through which biometric data is gathered from the user. This is one of 
critical parts of the system, because it usually determines the quality of the biometric system as a 
whole. If the acquired data is of poor quality, the whole system suffers. [18]
The first acquisition phase usually consists of two parts:
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Figure 1: General schematic of biometric enrollment and recognition [16]
1. quality assessment  -  the quality of the acquired data is automatically measured, if the 
system employs a minimum quality threshold, a low quality sample maybe rejected, and 
a new sample maybe required of the user.
2. segmentation - the irrelevant data is separated from the relevant information. 
The second phase is  called  representation -  the  data  acquired  in  the  first  phase must  be 
manipulated to be represented in a digital form. [18]
The third step is feature extraction. Feature extraction is the process by which key features of 
the sample are selected or enhanced. Typically, the process of feature extraction relies on a set of 
algorithms; the method varies depending on the type of biometric identification used. [18]
The fourth step is matching - in this step the extracted features are compared to the existing 
ones in a feature database. [18]
The last step is the decision. Based on the matching accuracy the system must make the 
decision of whether to accept or deny the user access. [18]
1.3 Advantages of biometric authentication
Knowledge- and key-based authentication are well-spread, but with the relevant security they 
provide, they have their fair share of problems as well. Reid [16] and Tsai et al [19]  and offer a 
conclusive list of problems for knowledge-based authentication, which we will not further 
discuss here, but will instead focus on the advantages of biometric authentication.
Biometric authentication is arguably  a lot more natural for human beings than knowledge-
based authentication, as we use it in our every day lives all the time. In addition to this, biometric 
data is very difficult to forge.[20]. The signal of biometric characteristic can range in size from 
several hundred bytes to even megabytes. This is provides significantly more entropy than a 
usual password, and thus is unfeasible to brute force using current methods. Thus biometric 
solutions provide the speed of entering small insecure passwords (the validation time) with the 
security of having very long passwords. [21]
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One of the advantages of biometric data is that it cannot be exchanged between people as in 
the case of knowledge-based solutions. A typical problem with password-based authentication 
schemes is that people readily exchange their passwords or write them down. Ironically  the 
likelihood that the password will be written down increases with the increase in the password's 
entropy   This problem could be avoided in the case of biometric solutions where this sort of 
exchange or external storage would be impossible.[18]
Another case could easily be made in favor of biometric solutions. Most password-choice 
strategies advise having both unique passwords and difficult to guess/brute-force for every 
separate resource (such as authenticating on a specific website). A modern user may thus need an 
infeasible number of unique passwords, very fast leading to password re-use or to the writing 
down the passwords as described above. Although this case maybe alleviated by the introduction 
of third party authentication services, we place an additional risk in trusting the third-party. In 
contrast,  in a biometric system we do not need to take any extra measures or precautions, nor do 
we need to introduce a third party for the authentication process for such cases as described 
above because biometric data is difficult to forge, as described above. [18] 
It has been suggested that due to the fact that password- or key-based authentication 
technologies and methods provide us with only a crisp binary output of either yes/no (was the 
user authenticated or not), could be seen as a negative aspect. A decision in a biometric system is 
always probabilistic, thus thresholds for match rates can be established to create systems that 
provide ways to establish user non-repudiation (that is that there is no possibility for the user to 
invalidate that he performed such and such actions). [22]
1.4 Problems with biometric authentication
Bruce  Schneier  (1994)  discusses  several  problems  with  biometric  authentication.  Although 
biometric data is difficult to forge, it is easy to steal. An attacker may steal our biometric data, 
because  we  leave  biologic  material  everywhere  (our  fingerprints  are  can  be  recovered 
everywhere, our face can be seen and voice heard in the public). Thus, according to Schneier, a 
method of biometric authentication is only secure as long as two conditions hold: 
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1. the  data  used  for  any  given  authentication  attempt  was  generated  at  the  time  of 
authentication, and 
2. that it can be matched with a master copy that is already present in the database. [20] 
Schneier also points out that biometric data, once stolen, cannot be restored to its former 
secure state.  In the cases of token- and knowledge-based authentication our certificates may be 
revoked or reinstated if the need be, but once biometric data has been compromised, it can never 
be securely reused again. For example, if one  fears that someone has gotten a hold of one's 
password, one can always change it, but one cannot change his biometric characteristics such as 
voice or face (at least in a non-trivial manner). [20] Recently, however, several researches have 
advocated the use of cancelable biometrics, so this issue might be alleviated. [23]
Furthermore, biometric authentication methods do not conform with the principle that every 
object should have a unique access key. For knowledge- and token-based authentication methods 
password or key reuse is considered dangerous, biometric authentication cannot avoid key reuse 
due to its nature. [20]
We lose the ability to have different levels of security levels: it could prove a great security 
risk if a highly critical system used the exactly same authentication as one's home front door. In 
the case of knowledge- and token-based systems this problem can easily be alleviated by using 
different keys with different key lengths varying on the criticalness of the given resource. [20]
Recall section 1.1.2 where the concept of universality was introduced.  It  becomes apparent 
that for any given system there will always exist a subset of persons who will not be able to 
provide the biometric sample, undermining the overall usability and applicability of the 
biometric authentication solutions. [18]
In addition to the problems listed by Schneier, we have to take into consideration the 
probabilistic nature of biometrics. When biological data are introduced to the biometric sensor, 
and extracted in order to be compared to an existing template on the system, the extraction 
process is always lossy. Thus, we always end up with incomplete information that is further 
distorted by environmental noise. So the biometric system must make probabilistic judgment 
whether the person is who she claims to be. This introduces the possibility  of both false 
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positives (a great security risk) and false negatives (a great problem for the usability of 
biometrics). The next section will discuss precisely these probabilistic measurements that are 
essentially characteristic of biometric systems. [18]
1.5 Measuring the efficacy of biometric systems
Having introduced the  general advantages and disadvantages of biometric authentication, it 
would  seem  reasonable  to  develop  some  sort  of  metrics  that  are  specific  to  biometric 
authentication. Let us consider the problem of measuring the security, scalability and usability of 
a biometric systems. In order to have objective criteria for such characterizations, we must first 
define some mathematical measures.
1.5.1 FAR (False Acceptance Rate)
FAR is defined as the probability that a user making a false claim about his/her identity will 
be verified as that false identity [16]. FAR can be calculated as follows:
The probability that a fraudulent attempt is successful against a enrolled person n:
FAR ( n )= Number of successful independent fraud attempts against a person n
Number of all independent fraud attempts against a person n [24]
The overall FAR for N persons is defined as:
FAR =∑
n=1
N
FAR (n )
 [24]
FAR as statistical measure actually measures the effectiveness of the underlying biometric 
algorithm. If the algorithm is ineffective and accepts too many fraudulent users it is indicated by 
a high percentage of FAR. [16]
1.5.2 FRR (False Rejection Rate)
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The FRR is defined as the probability that a user making a true claim about his/her identity 
will be rejected as him/herself. [16]
The probability that a non-fraudulent person n is not successful on identification FRR(n): 
FRR ( n )= Number of rejected verification attempts for a qualified person n
Number of all verification attempts for a qualified person n  [24]
Similarly to to general FAR, the general FAR for N people can be calculated as follows:
FRR=∑
n=1
N
FRR (n )
[24]
FRR as a statistical measure indicates the robustness of the system. If the FRR is too high, in 
the best case scenario only the usability of the biometric system might slightly suffer, but on the 
other end of the spectrum,  if the false rejections are too common, the system becomes unusable 
and inaccessible. [15]
Both FAR and FRR can be seen as measures of scalability. With the increased number of 
users the likelihood rises that the characteristics of any two persons are indistinguishable by the 
given biometric algorithm or undetectable by the biometric sensor.[15][24]
1.5.3 EER (Equal Error Rate)
Equal error rate (EER), often also referred to as cross-over error rate (CER) takes both of the 
two previously defined statistical measures of FAR and FRR into account.  The interdependence 
of the two statistical measures is self-evident: for example, if we increase the sensitivity of the 
matching algorithm (require a tighter match), we may achieve a lower FAR, whereas the 
increased sensitivity might cause the ERR to rise,  as more and more users are then falsely 
rejected. Conversely, when we “desensitize”  the algorithm  the opposite effect is produced: an 
increased FAR and a decreased EER.  Due to this matter of fact, it makes sense to plot the ERR 
and FAR of a given system together. EER is thus a statistical measure that is indicative of the 
accuracy of the biometric system. [19]
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FAR, FRR and EER are not the only statistical  measures, but they are arguably the more 
important ones. For the sake of brevity these other statistical measures will not be discussed in 
this thesis. [15][24]
Biometric Cross-over accuracy
Retinal Scan .000001%
Iris Scan .000763%
Fingerprints .2%
Hand geometry .2%
Signature Dynamics 2%
Voice Dynamics 2%
Table 1: The cross-over rates of various biometrics by Liu and Silverman [25]
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Figure 2: EER (CER) as a relation between 
FAR and FRR [25]
Chapter 2: Voice-based Biometrics
An brief overview of the current state of biometric technology, its advantages and 
disadvantages in comparison to knowledge-based authentication general was given in chapter 1. 
Let us now narrow our focus to voice-based authentication. 
A voice-based biometric system is a biometric system that employs speaker verification or 
speech recognition or the conjunction of the two to authorize a user.
2.1 Evaluating Voice-based Biometric Authentication
Biometric 
characteristic
U
niversality
D
istinctiveness
Perm
anence
C
ollectability
Perform
ance
A
cceptability
DNA H H H L H L
Ear M M H M M H
Face H L M H L H
Facial thermogram H H L H M H
Fingerprint M H H M H M
Gait M L L H L H
Hand geometry M M M H M M
Hand vein M M M M M M
Iris H H H M H L
Keystroke L L L M L M
Odor H H H L L M
Palmprint M H H M H M
Retina H H M L H L
20
Signature L L L H L H
Voice M L L M L H
Table 2: Comparison of various biometric technologies by Jain et al (2004) [16]
L – low, M -medium, H- high
Let us first  evaluate  the viability  of voice-based biometrics based on some of the criteria 
introduced in the first chapter. 
Reid (2004) grades voice-based biometric authentication on the scale of 0-10 (from bad to 
excellent). FAR for voice-based systems receives a rating of  6, and a FRR score of 6. These are 
quite low when compared to face recognition's score of 7.5 for both FAR and FRR. Reid argues 
that FAR and FRR score low (meaning that the FAR and FRR percentages are high) due to the 
noise in background, and points (similarly to Jain et al.) to the matter of fact that voice (its 
behavioral characteristic) may vary greatly due to the emotional state of the person. [15]
According to the table 1 in section 1.5.3 the EER is for one of the highest and is matched only 
by the EER of signature dynamics. This means that voice as a biometric is not very accurate 
when compared to other biometrics in general.
Recall the 5 criteria discussed in the grading is on the scale of 0 to 10 and is based on Reid 
(2004) From table 2 we can see that the strong points for voice recognition is that is universally 
available and easily collectible, while its not very distinctive, nor permanent. Although in the 
case of permanence Jain et al argue that the question is two-fold: while a person's voice is quite 
permanent (as a biological characteristic), voice also has a behavioral characteristic which might 
differ greatly due to emotions or illness. They add that despite voice-based authentication's 
shortcomings it's highly acceptable and non-obtrusive for the users, and irreplaceable for some 
situations like telephony-based applications. [15]
2.2 A Naïve Solution
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Let us at first consider a very simplistic approach for using voice-based biometric 
authentication to demonstrate its weakness. A simplistic biometric system voiced-based 
authentication is seen in figure 3. This system uses a predefined PIN to authenticate its users.  In 
step 1 the authorized user Bob can be seen uttering the PIN code. The system matches Bob's 
input to the enrolled version of him saying the very same password. However, without Bob's 
knowing his utterance has been recorded by a malicious user, Malroy. Now, in step 2,  Malroy 
plays the very same utterance from a recording device to the system.  Systems that rely on this 
kind of a naïve solution will accept the recording as genuine as long as the recording is of decent 
quality.[10]  This is a well-known attack vector for biometric authentication which will be 
discussed in the next section.
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Figure 3: Execution of a playback (replay) attack introduced by Shang (2008) [10]
2.3 Replay attacks
Biometric  systems are  not  completely  invulnerable.  A list  of  known attack  vectors  exists 
which  target  all  of  the  major  components  of  a  biometric  system.  A  conclusive  listing  and 
description  of  these  known  vulnerabilities  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  but  figure  4 
illustrates which parts of a generic biometric system could possibly be attacked.
Recall  the last section where the idea of a naïve implementation which was vulnerable to 
replaying a recorded utterance of the PIN was discussed. This form of an attack is known as a 
replay attack.  In general, a replay attack, sometimes also referred to as a “playback attack”,  is 
a  form of  network  attack  in  which  a  valid  data  transmission  is  maliciously  or  fraudulently 
repeated or delayed. Thus, biometric authentication in a very general sense is also vulnerable to 
this attack vector [21].
In a typical biometric system replay attacks could occur between attack points point No. 1 
either point No. 2, as depicted in figure 4. Point No. 2 stands for the communication between the 
sensor and the feature extraction device, whereas point No. 1 stands for the communication with 
the biometric sensor. The line of communication for point No. 2 is usually encrypted, thus 
providing relevant security between the sensor and the feature extraction device [21]. According 
to the definition given above both of these are forms of replay attacks, but let us differentiate 
between these two by means of two definitions. 
23
Figure 4: The possible attack points of a biometric system [21]
Let us define a on-the-wire replay attack as tampering with the signal between the sensor 
and feature extraction device in attack point no. 2, in contrast to a simple replay attack, which 
relies on replaying a recorded signal to the sensor. This thesis will only concentrate on the latter 
as it requires a lot less technical expertise to carry out, and is thus privy to even non-technical 
attackers. Thus, in the next and forthcoming sections references to replay attacks refer only to 
simple replay attacks as defined above.
2.4 Considering Possible Solutions
Recall the literature discussed in the beginning of this thesis. Three general solutions were 
hinted at. These solutions can be explicated as follows:
1) similarity based solutions – these include PAD-like implementations like those posed by 
Shang (2008) which try to find the similarities or nonlinearities Malik (2011) in the signal 
to make sure it is not duplicated by replays.
2) liveness testing – a solution discussed by Toth (2005) where multi-modal (solutions that 
employ several biometrics in conjunction) systems that rely on challenging the users with 
facial  expressions (the users are asked to smile or blink) to ascertain that a real  alive 
person is there instead of a video feed.
3) vocal random challenge based solutions – the solution here is to prompt the user with a 
challenge of random word or a sequence of words.  The randomness of the challenge 
would ensure that the replay attack could not occur. 
This thesis maintains that the most simple and cost-effective solution would be to employ 
vocal random challenges. The rationale is the following: while signal comparison based solutions 
require either complicated mathematical frameworks or extensive training for attacker modeling, 
and the liveness based approaches require extra equipment which not be applicable for 
telephony-based cases, vocal random challenge based systems would be a lot easier and cheaper 
to implement.  In addition, the development of these systems would require experts in the field, 
and as of yet no such open source frameworks exist. Due to the issues just mentioned, and due to 
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the fact that relying solely on open source tools was one of the requirements for the university 
project, these other possible solutions will now be set aside.
2.5 Vocal Random Challenges
In the last section the rationale behind choosing vocal  random challenges was discussed. 
Vocal random challenges can be of the following type:
1) single digits like, for example ONE
2) sequences of single digits, for example: ONE-TWO-THREE
3) numbers, for example ONE THOUSAND AND ONE
4) single words, for example HORSE
5) sequences of words (sentences), for example: LIVE LONG AND PROSPER
Even intuitively it would seem that accuracy of the systems which rely on a small amount of 
phrases would be greater,  the reason for this  will  become apparent  once an overview of the 
inner-workings speech recognition is given in chapter 3. On the other hand though, the systems 
that  would  rely  on  simpler  methods,  would  be  more  vulnerable  to  concatenation  attacks  as 
described by Genoud and Chollet (1999), because the for example the digits from 1 to 9 could 
very easily be extracted from everyday speech and then concatenated. 
2.6 Components of Vocal Random-challenge Based System
The system must known which words are being uttered and thus implement some form of a a 
speech recognition expert. But the system must also know that speaker is who he claims to be, 
so it must additionally implement a speaker verification expert as well. The result from both of 
these experts will be fused together in a decision module which then take the decision whether or 
not to authorize the person based on its configuration. The implementation of such a system will 
be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Practical Solution
3.1 Overview of the Biometric System
The concept of vocal  random challenges was introduced in chapter 2. Figure 5  depicts the 
overall structure where the result of this practical thesis will be deployed. The system is 
composed of three main parts: the speech recognition expert, the speaker verification expert, and 
the decision module as seen in figure 4. This greater system is based on the commercial product 
that was introduced in the state of the art secton of this thesis - ComBiom. 
The speech recognition expert gives a scoring on how well the word was matched the 
challenge word. The Speaker verification gives a scoring on how certain it is that speaker is.  The 
decision module makes the decision whether or not authorize the user on the predefined 
threshold value taking into consideration both of scores from two speech experts.
However, the scope of this thesis only limited to the speech recognition expert,  so from 
hereon the speaker verification part will not be discussed further, the speaker verification expert 
will be considered to be a black box that the internals of which we are not concerned with. We 
just assume that it carries out its function and provides the  decision module a scoring of how 
likely it is that the person is who he/she claims to be.
26
Illustration 2: A system deployed to protect against replay attacks using random challenges. 
Figure 5: The structure of the complete biometric system 
3.2 Tool Selection Process
A number of currently available voice recognition frameworks/technologies were considered 
for the practical output of this thesis, and as a result CMU Sphinx voice recognition toolkit was 
chosen. To understand the rationale behind the choice we must first establish what kind of 
criteria and characteristics were required of the proposed tool. The requirements were not 
arbitrary, but were imposed on me by the requirements of the aforementioned multi-modal 
biometric solution for Biometry Group of Tartu University.  The list  of requirements was the 
following:
1. Open  source  code  -  the  framework  must  include  its  source  code  in  case  further 
improvements or development is necessary.
2. Free software -  for our purposes the framework must be free of charge.
3. Permissive license -  a permissive license is required if a commercial solution is ever 
created from the prototype. Due to this reason, all non-permissive and copy-alike licenses 
such as GPL would have to be discarded.
4. Optimized  for  mobile  devices  -  the  memory  and  CPU  requirements  for  the  chosen 
solution must be minimal to accommodate speech recognition on mobile devices.
5. An ideal  solution  would  provide  support  for  both  Windows and Unix-like  operating 
systems
Framework Free 
software
Permissive 
license
Programming 
language 
API/bindings
Operating 
systems
English 
Acoustic 
model 
available
Optimized 
for  mobile 
devices
CMU 
Sphinx
Yes Yes (BSD) Java, Python, 
C
Unix-like, 
Windows
Yes Yes
Julius Yes Yes (BSD) C, Windows 
SAPI
Unix-like, 
Windows
Yes Yes
27
Simon Yes No (GPL) N/A Linux No No
Table 3 – a table of currently available open source voice recognition frameworks [1][26][27]
[28][29]
As can be seen from the information represent in table 3, only two out of the three proposed 
frameworks are suitable. Simon was discarded due to its unsuitable licensing, GUI only 
interface, and the non-existence of previously generated acoustic models for the English 
language. While Simon could prove to be an appropriate choice for other use cases, it does 
definitely fit with the 5 criteria listed above.
The final choice between Julius and CMU Sphinx was decided by the number of language 
bindings available, the size of the active developer community, and due to the fact that there was 
more  documentation  available  for  CMU  Sphinx. Another  deciding  factor  was  that  English 
acoustic models for Julius were not included with Julius itself, but were created by the VoxForge 
project as a joint community effort, whereas CMU Sphinx came with highly-trained acoustic 
models  for  English  included.  While  the  Julius  speech decoder  has  a  permissive  licence,  the 
VoxForge acoustic models cannot be used in any commercial solutions. [30]
CMU Sphinx has several different versions [2]. Again, due to the requirements imposed by 
the biometry project, a minimal version of the speech recognition framework - PocketSphinx - 
was chosen. PocketSphinx is written entirely in the C programming language with bindings for 
popular interpreted languages like Python[2]. This joins the ease of development with the best 
possible performance.   
3.3 Brief Introduction to Speech Recognition
In order to show how the discussed tools for speech recognition work, an overview must 
given on how speech recognition works in general. This, however, requires that we first acquaint 
ourselves with several terms, definitions and concepts specific to this field. The overview of the 
theory behind speech recognition will be avoided, and will be represented in a very general 
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manner due to its complexity and due to the fact that a thorough insight itself would amount to a 
bachelor’s or master’s thesis on its own.
 
Figure 6 - A high level overview of the speech recognition process and its main constituents.
Translated and modified image  from Tallinn University of Technology materials [31].
First of all it should be noted that speech is a non-discrete phenomenon, meaning that is does 
not compose of discrete units that could be easily separated as spoken words, thus speech 
certainly cannot be regarded as “acoustic text”, as it is often erroneously though possible. Due to 
this, the analog speech signal itself cannot directly be used for speech recognition. In order to use 
the signal for recognition, certain features  must first be extracted from it. [31]
The first step of the recognition process is pre-processing (after the analog waveform as been 
digitalized), as depicted in Figure 1. During pre-processing speech is split into very small time 
units called frames (often as short as 10 milliseconds). For each such frame we can calculate a 
feature vector, a set of numbers representing the speech frame along with about 30 coefficients. 
The rationale behind using feature vectors is two-fold: to decrease the amount of information, 
and to accentuate those features that differ the most between different phones. The idea is that 
features should enable to differentiate between different phones, and at the same time disregard 
irrelevant aspects such as environmental and background noise, microphone idiosyncrasies, and 
the emotions of the speaker.  The resulting output of the preprocessing step is a sequence of 
feature vectors, which represent the speech signal in much more compact manner than the initial 
digitalized waveform. For example, in the case of 16 kHz frequency and 16 bit depth digitalized 
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speech signal with a duration of a second the size amounts to 32000 bytes per second, whereas 
its  sequence  of  feature  vectors  may  only  amount  to  a  mere  5200  bytes  (in  case  of  a  13-
dimensional real number feature vector). [31]
    After the pre-processing step has generated the sequence of feature vectors, the sequences are 
fed to the speech decoder. This brings us arguably the most important component of a speech 
recognition engine - the acoustic model. Acoustic models are used to model phones. The 
phonetic dictionary includes all of the known pronunciations of the applications. The idea behind 
acoustic models is that they determine how similar arbitrary feature vectors are to the speech 
signal, in other words, how probable is that the given speech signal is the speech signal we have 
described. Acoustic models rely on the use hidden Markov models (HMMs) [32]
Due to the fact that natural speech is too imprecise as people tend not to utter the words in 
their full form, leaving the end of words unsaid and thus multiple words overlapping, and when 
nothing about the language at hand is known we have no way of delimiting words in a sequence 
of phones. For example, Consider the phone sequence thequickbrownfoxjumpsoverthelazydog. 
This could result in different combinations of phones for words if we do not know which word 
the language contains. Thus,  we need to have a representation of the language. The solution here 
is to employ language models. In very simplistic terms, language models can be considered to 
be a list of valid words for a given language. [31]
3.4 Practical Solution with PocketSphinx
3.4.1 The Components of PocketSphinx 
In the last chapter the concepts of phonetic dictionaries, acoustic models. language models 
and speech decoders were introduced. These are also the very same constituents that make up 
PocketSphinx. By default two acoustic models are available: TIDIGITS[33] and WSJ1[34]. 
TIDIGITS is an acoustic model that is highly optimized for only digit recognition. Conversely 
the WSJ1 – Wall Street Journal –  which was created to match a wide variety of words from 
natural speech and trained using dictations of hypothetical news reports by journalists [34]. The 
language model consists only of 11 words for TIDIGITS, but 6627 words for WSJ1[33][34]. 
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3.4.2 Requirements for the Environment
1. Unix-like operating system. Preferably a Debian-based distribution (Ubuntu), so that the 
packages for PocketSphinx are available on the repository  and would not have to be 
manually compiled 
2. Python v2.65 or greater installed 
3. FFmpeg  installed [35]  
4. GStreamer bindings [36] 
These dependencies should all be resolved by running the installation.sh file located in the root 
folder of this project.
3.4.3 Graphical User Interface
The application uses a mock door a to demonstrate the communication procedure with an 
outside device. The application uses the telnet protocol to send messages to and receive 
messages from the door. The door is just used as an analogy: the door could be replaced by any 
resource that requires authorization.  according to. The lights on the door indicate whether the 
door is unlocked or locked.
The program can be started by running the shell script start.sh . This starts the GUI along 
with the mock door. The user is prompted with two regular buttons and a two radio buttons. The 
radio buttons stand for whether the challenges are words or numbers respectively. If the use 
clicks the 'Get challenge' button, a vocal random challenge will be generated based on the 
previous position of the radio button (figure 8). In case “Words”  was selected the challenges 
appear as pictures instead, as seen in  figure 9. The user can then press Speak and utter the 
challenge. The program will automatically detect when the user has stopped talking and respond 
by evaluating the uttered phrase and comparing it to the random challenge. Once this process is 
completed, the program will acknowledge the user by a dialog whether the input was correct or 
not (figures 10, and 11 respectively), and open the door (figure 12) or do nothing (figure 7) .    
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Figure 11: The user is displayed an error 
message on failure
Figure 10: The user is displayed that the door is 
unlocked
 
Figure 8 – the user must utter 93990
Figure 7: A Closed mock door that illustrates a 
resource that needs authorization.
Figure 9: Example of a word-based challenge. The 
user must utter "horse" after pressing the speak 
button
3.4.4 Command Line Interface
While the GUI interface along with the door could be useful in some application, it would be 
more sensible to use it as a subprogram that is invoked from other programs. For this reason a 
command line version of the verification tool is included. The GUI version supported continuous 
speech by and the GStreamer plug-in took care of all the audio conversion. However, as most of 
the audio would be coming from different sources (for example,  from a mobile device sent to a 
server) the audio must now be saved into wave form with the proper format. PocketSphinx uses 
16 kHz frequency and a single audio channel. For this purpose,  a conversion script (convert.sh) 
is included which uses FFMpeg to convert the audio into the proper format.  convert.sh should 
used before running check.sh, if unsure about the audio format.
The validation program can be invoked using a shell script check.sh. The program will output 
the percentage of match to STDOUT (standard output).
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Figure 12: The door is opened on correctly guessing the word
The syntax for check.sh
        ./check.sh [filename.wav] [challenge to check against]
Example usage of check.sh
./check.sh onetwothree.wav 123
The syntax for convert.sh
 ./convert.sh [input-file] [output-file]
Example usage of convert.sh
./convert.sh onetwothree.mp3 onetwothree.wav
3.4.5 Configuration
Configuration  is  currently  available  for  the  demo  application,  for  the  command  line 
application it must be changed from the source code. 
The configuration is done by manually editing the configuration file  CONFIG with a text-
editor.  Setting-variables  are  presented  in  uppercase  letters,  e.g  “TIDIGITS_HMMDIR”,  and 
delimited from values by a “:” symbol:
VARIABLE: value 
The following configuration settings are available:
1. TIDIGITS_HMMDIR  –  specifies  the  directory  where  the  acoustic  model  for  the 
TIDIGITs is stored.
2. WSJ_HMMDIR – specifies the directory where the acoustic for the Wall Street Journal is 
located
3. TIDIGITS_LANGUAGE_MODEL – specifies the language model file for TIDIGITS
4. TIDIGITS_DICTIONARY – specifies the dictionary file for TIDIGITS
5. WSJ_LANGUANGE_MODEL –  specifies  the  language model  file  for  the  Wall  Street 
Journal model
6. WSJ_DICTIONARY – specifies the phonetic dictionary file the WSJ model
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7. NUMBER SEQUENCE_LENGTH – specifies how long the random number are 
Note that all the paths must be relative to the folder that start.sh is located in. Also note that the 
images for each word must be located in the images directory and the words must themselves be 
stored in the vocab file in the root folder.
3.4.4 Custom Language Model Generation
One can also define a custom dictionary of words which one might wish to recognize, the 
only limitation here being that the acoustic model has to be suitably trained. Luckily for the most 
common words you can use the WSJ1 (Wall Street Journal) which in great likelihood can be 
used to recognize the words. 
To create one's own language model and phonetic dictionary, one must use the Sphinx online 
language modeling tool also known as lmtool  [37]. The list of valid words (or sentences) is 
referred to as the corpus [37]. The corpus must be represented in file in which each word  or 
sentence is delimited by a new line character. The site provides an upload form where one can 
upload this text-based corpus and it will generate the appropriate language model and phonetic 
dictionary. The site will then prompt the user with the files which can be downloaded either as a 
tarball or as single files, as demonstrated in figure  13. To use these custom dictionary and 
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Figure 13: The list of resulting files from the online lmtool 
language model files, one must set them in the up in the CONFIG file as  WSJ_DICTIONARY 
and WSJ_LANGUAGE_MODEL respectively. To add pictures, insert them in the images folder 
as  word_to_be_recognized.jpg. The vocabulary file from the website (0927.vocab depicted in 
figure 13) should be replace the vocab file in the root directory. 
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Possible Future Work
Acoustic Model Accuracy Training
While the generic acoustic models are suitable for different English words and sequences of 
digits, they fall short when the words are very similar to each other. An attempt was made to 
accommodate an opportunity for the user to insert the sequences of digits  as numbers instead. 
Thus, for the the challenge posed in section 3.4.3 in figure 5, the random challenge of 9713 could 
be  uttered  as  “NINE-SEVEN-ONE-THREE”  or  “NINE  THOUSAND  SEVEN  HUNDRED 
AND THIRTEEN”, both being equally valid. However, when attempting this,  the Wall Street 
Journal acoustic model had to be used instead of TIDIGITS because TIDIGITS does not include 
the anything but the digits from 0 to 9.  The result was that the Sphinx recognition could not tell  
apart between numbers such as seventy and seventeen. 
The author maintains that the security of the vocal random challenges for this system could be 
increased  by varying whether  the user has to  present  “9713” the sequence of  digits  or  as a 
number. This could be improved my training the acoustic models
Offline Language Model Generation
Currently a big inconvenience for using the practical solution as a library is that the language 
models must be generated online using the Sphinx Knowledge Base Tool. A big improvement 
could be made to the system in terms of usability if the process of modifying the list of valid  
words could be achieved in a single step. This feature was not added to the practical solution due 
to time limitations. 
Testing
For implementing the practical solution in a production environment it would be necessary to 
measure the actual FRR, FAR and EER of the solution. But testing at this point would not yield 
much information, as testing for the acoustic models has already been done by their acoustic 
model developers. To gather new valuable insight the testing would also have to be carried out in 
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conjunction with the speaker verification expert, but this would time-consuming goal would have 
well been outside the scope of this thesis.
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Conclusions
The goal for thesis was to create a working speech recognition software for a open source 
biometric authentication system. This goal has been fulfilled and the software is operational. 
PocketSphinx,  an  open  source  speech  recognition  tool  developed  at  the  Carnegie  Mellon 
University, was used for this purpose. The practical outputs of the thesis are a demo application 
with graphical user interface which demonstrates the capabilities of PocketSphinx, and command 
line application that can be added to existing systems to provide a speech recognition capability. 
While the current version of the software is fully functional, it has not been thoroughly tested, 
and generating language models is not very convenient for the user at this moment. Also the 
number recognition part is not yet implemented which could dramatically increase the overall 
security of the vocal random challenges. These three points should not be seen as deficiencies, 
but as goals for future work to be done on the software which were not achievable in the scope of 
this thesis.
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Adaptiivne kõnepõhine juhuväljakutsete tugi biomeetrilisele 
autentimisele
Bakalaureusetöö (6 EAP)
Uku Loskit
Käesoleva bakalaureusetöö  eesmärgiks oli arendada välja kõnetuvastusprogramm, mida 
saaks kasutada vokaalsete juhuväljakutse tarvis. Programmi eesmärgiks oli  anda üks  võimalik 
lahendus kõnepõhilise biomeetrilise autentimise kesksele turvaprobleemile – taasesitusrünnetele. 
Programm põhineb vabavaralisel PocketSphinxi kõnetuvastuse tööriistal ning on kirjutatud 
Pythoni programmeerimiskeeles.
Loodud rakendus koosneb kahest osast:  kasutajaliidesega varustatud 
demonstratsiooniprogrammist ja käsurea  utiilidist. Kasutajaliidesega rakendus sobib 
kõnetuvastusteegi võimete demonstreerimiseks, käsurea  utiliiti saab aga kasutada mis tahes 
teisele programmile kõnetuvastusvõimekuse lisamiseks.
Kasutajaliidesega rakenduses saab kasutaja oma hääle abil programmiga vahetult suheldes 
avada näitlikustamiseks loodud demoprogrammi ust. Kasutaja peab ütlema  õige numbrite jada 
või pildile vastava sõna inglise keeles, et programmi poolt autoriseeritud saada. 
Mõlemat loodud rakendust saab seadistada luues oma keelemudeleid või muutes 
demorakenduse puhul numbriliste juhuväljakutsete pikkust.
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Appendix
The source code of the practical solution, the required language and acoustic models, and 
phonetic dictionaries that were produced as a result of this thesis are included on a DVD that is 
attached to the back cover of this thesis.
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